Testimony Of
William W. Millar,
President
American Public Transportation Association
Before The
Subcommittee On Emergency Preparedness, Science, And Technology
Of The
House Homeland Security Committee
***********
July 26, 2005
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in Adobe PDF format)
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to submit written testimony on the security and safety of public transportation systems. We appreciate your interest in transportation security, and we look forward to working with you on these issues.
ABOUT APTA
The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) is a nonprofit international association of over 1,500 public and private member organizations including transit systems and commuter rail operators; planning, design, construction, and finance firms; product and service providers; academic institutions; transit associations and state departments of transportation. APTA members serve the public interest by providing safe, efficient, and economical transit services and products. Over ninety percent of persons using public transportation in the United States and Canada are served by APTA member systems.
OVERVIEW
Mr. Chairman, public transportation is one of our nation's critical infrastructures. We cannot over-emphasize the critical importance of our industry to the economic quality of life of this country. Over 9.6 billion transit trips are taken annually on all modes of transit service. People use public transportation vehicles over 32 million times each weekday. This is more than sixteen times the number of daily travelers aboard the nation's airlines.
Safety and security are the top priority of the public transportation industry. Transit systems took many steps to improve security prior to 9/11 and have significantly increased efforts since then. Since September 11, 2001, public transit agencies in the United States have spent over $2 billion on security and emergency preparedness programs and technology, almost all from their own budgets with only minimal federal funding. This year's events in London and last year's events in Madrid further highlight the need to enhance security on public transit systems and to do so without delay. We do not need another wakeup call like London and Madrid.
In response to an APTA survey, transit agencies around the country have identified in excess of $6 billion in transit security needs. State and local governments and transit agencies are doing what they can to improve security, but it is important that the federal government be a full partner in the effort to ensure the security of the nation's transit users.
In FY 2003, transit security received $65 million in federal funding from DHS. In FY 2004, $50 million was provided for federal transit security programs from DHS. For the first time in FY 2005, Congress specifically appropriated $150 million for transit, passenger and freight rail security. Out of the $150 million, transit will receive approximately $130 million-almost $108 million for rail transit and more than $22 million for bus. Also, ferries will receive an additional $5 million for security from a separate account. We are very appreciative of this effort. However, in the face of significant needs, more needs to be done.
We urge Congress to act decisively on this issue. In light of the documented needs, we have respectfully urged Congress to provide $2 billion in the FY 2006 Homeland Security Appropriations bill for transit security. Of that amount, we recommended that $1.2 billion be provided for capital needs, and $800 million for transit costs. Federal funding for needs should provide for, among other things, planning, public awareness, training and additional transit police.
We were disappointed that the Administration recommended only $600 million for a Targeted Infrastructure Protection Program in the FY 2006 DHS budget proposal, which would fund infrastructure security grants for transit, seaports, railways and energy facilities. We were also disappointed that the Administration did not include a specific line item funding amount for transit security. We look forward to working with the Administration and Congress in securing adequate transit security funding that begins to address unmet transit security needs of the country.
We further request that the existing process for distributing DHS federal grant funding be modified so that funds are distributed directly to transit authorities, rather than to State Administrating Agencies (SAA). While we are willing to coordinate with the states and urban areas that we serve, we believe direct funding to the transit authorities would be more efficient and productive.
We are pleased to note that APTA has become a "Standards Development Organization" (SDO) for the public transportation industry. Our efforts in standards development for commuter rail, rail transit and bus transit operations over recent years have been significant and our status as a SDO has been acknowledged by both the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and the Federal Railway Administration (FRA). The FTA and the Transportation Research Board have also supported our standards initiatives through the provision of grants. We would like to apply our growing expertise in standards development of transit industry safety and security, best practices, guidelines and standards. We look forward to working with the Administration and Congress in support of this initiative and trust that federal financial assistance would be made available to develop such standards and practices.
We also would like to work with Congress and the Department of Homeland Security's Directorate of Science and Technology to take a leadership role in advancing research and technology development to enhance security and emergency preparedness for public transportation.
INFORMATION SHARING
Since the tragedy of September 11, 2001, public transit systems across the country have worked very hard to strengthen their security plans and procedures and have been very active in training personnel and conducting drills to test their capacity to respond to emergencies. As well, to the extent possible within their respective budgets, transit systems have been incrementally hardening their services through the introduction of additional technologies such as surveillance equipment, access control and intrusion detection systems. While the transit systems have been diligent, they have been significantly hindered in their desired programs by the lack of funding support forthcoming through federal sources.
Notwithstanding the lack of DHS funding, APTA, the transit industry and the Federal Transit Administration were able to form a very strong partnership through the initial years following 9/11 that led to the development of numerous security and emergency preparedness tools and resources that are now shared throughout the entire industry.
The APTA membership includes many of the major international public transportation systems such as the London Underground, Madrid Metro, and the Moscow Metro. APTA also has a strong partnership with the European-based transportation association, the International Union of Public Transport. Through these relationships, APTA has maintained a strong connection with these organizations and we have, in fact, participated in a number of special forums that have brought these organizations together both here in America and in Europe.
It is clear that the nature of public transportation, both in the U.S. and abroad is consistent in that in order to effectively transport millions of people daily, public transit is by need and design, an open infrastructure. In these environments, stations, trains and buses become points of congregation of large numbers of people. Consequently, the risk exposures and vulnerabilities from Los Angeles to New York and from London to Madrid and Moscow are the same.
A vital component of ensuring public transit's ability to prepare and respond to critical events is the timely receipt of security intelligence in the form of threats, warnings, advisories and access to informational resources. Accordingly, in 2003, the American Public Transportation Association, supported by Presidential Decision Directive #63, established an "Information Sharing Analysis Center (ISAC)" for public transit systems throughout the United States. A funding grant in the amount of $1.2 million was provided to APTA by the Federal Transit Administration to establish a very successful Public Transit ISAC that operated 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and gathered information from various sources, including DHS, and then passed information on to transit systems following a careful analysis of that information. However, given that the Federal Transit Administration was subsequently unable to access security funds, and given the decision of DHS to not fund ISAC operations, APTA then had to look for an alternate method of providing security intelligence through DHS's newly created "Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)." APTA is now in the process of transitioning from the successful Public Transit ISAC to the new HSIN network. However, we believe that consistent, on-going and reliable funds from Congress should be provided for the Public Transit ISAC that has been an effective enterprise.
With respect to other forms of communication through DHS, daily summarized communications are issued via the Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection that provide highlights of news items for all the various critical infrastructures. Also, effective late 2004, the TSA commenced a weekly stakeholder teleconference to cover highlights of any security-related events and provide stakeholders with opportunities to ask questions or comment on issues.
Following the terrorist attacks in Madrid in March, 2004 and the recent attacks in London, DHS raised the threat level of public transportation to "Orange" (High) and conducted two teleconference calls, one at 10:30 AM with representatives of the various ISAC's and sector coordinators and a later call at 12:45 PM with representatives of various transit and rail passenger systems. The public transportation systems, however, did not wait for the DHS threat level increase to take action. In fact, as soon as the U.S. transit systems became aware of the London attacks, they immediately put into motion a number of security measures including deployment of additional police, security and supervisory personnel and they began an intensified level of vehicle, station and right-of-way checks.
Later on July 11, 2005, APTA was requested to assist the TSA in conducting a teleconference between the TSA and transit officials to discuss transit impacts pertaining to both increasing and decreasing the DHS threat levels. There is no question that increased threat levels have a dramatic impact on budget expenditures of transit systems and extended periods pose significant impacts on personnel.
SECURITY INVESTMENT NEEDS
Mr. Chairman, after the awful events of 9/11, the transit industry invested some $2 billion in enhanced security measures, building on the industry's already considerable efforts. At the same time, our industry undertook a comprehensive review to determine how we could build upon our existing industry security practices. This included a range of activities, some I discussed earlier in testimony, which include research, best practices, education, information sharing in the industry, and surveys. As a result of these efforts we have a better understanding of how to create a more secure environment for our riders, and the most critical security investment needs.
Our latest survey of public transportation security identified enhancements of at least $5.2 billion in additional capital funding to maintain, modernize, and expand transit system security functions to meet increased security demands. Over $800 million in increased costs for security personnel, training, technical support, and research and development have been identified, bringing total additional transit security funding needs to more than $6 billion.
Responding transit agencies were asked to prioritize the uses for which they required additional federal investment for security improvements. Priority examples of operational improvements include:
Funding current and additional transit agency and local law enforcement personnel.
Funding for over-time costs and extra security personnel during heightened alert levels.
Training for security personnel.
Joint transit/law enforcement training.
Security planning activities.
Security training for other transit personnel.
Priority examples of security capital investment improvements include:
Radio communications systems.
Security cameras on-board transit vehicles and in transit stations.
Controlling access to transit facilities and secure areas.
Automated vehicle locator systems.
Security fencing around facilities.
Transit agencies with large rail operations also reported a priority need for federal capital funding for intrusion detection devices.
Mr. Chairman, the Department of Homeland Security issued directives for the transit industry in May 2004, which would require that transit authorities beef up security and to take a series of precautions which would set the stage for more extensive measures without any federal funding assistance. We believe these directives are unfunded mandates. Many of our transit systems have already carried out most of the measures that Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is calling for, such as drafting security plans, removing trash bins and setting up procedures to deal with suspicious packages. The cost of these measures and further diligence taken during times of heightened alert is of particular concern to us. We look forward to working with you in addressing these issues.
As you know, in the FY 2005 Homeland Security Appropriations bill (PL 108-334), TSA can hire up to 100 rail inspectors using a $10 million appropriation. We have concerns about this provision. We believe that funding for the inspectors would be better spent on things that would support the industry such as surveillance cameras, and emergency communication and other systems rather than highlighting security issues without providing the necessary resources to address them. We look forward to working with you in addressing our concerns.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Chairman, prior to and following September 11, 2001-the date of the most devastating terrorist attack in U.S. history-APTA has played a key role in addressing the safety and security issues of our country. American public transportation agencies have also taken significant measures to enhance their security and emergency preparedness efforts to adjust to society's new state of concern. Although agencies had a wide range of security initiatives in place at the time of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks and already had developed emergency response plans, the September 11 incidents focused, strengthened and prioritized security efforts throughout the industry.
Transit agencies have had an excellent safety record and have worked for years to enhance their system security and employee security training, by following government standards and APTA guidelines, and by learning from the attacks on transit agencies abroad. For example, the 1995 sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system caused U.S. transit properties managing tunnels and underground transit stations to go on high alert. The San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District, for instance, responded to the potential threat of chemical weapons attacks by sending a transit police team to Fort McClellan, Alabama, to learn response tactics from U.S. Army chemical weapons experts.
In the months following the September 11 terrorist attacks, transit agencies of all sizes worked to identify where they might be vulnerable to attacks and increased their security spending for both operations and capital costs. The agencies subsequently upgraded and strengthened their emergency response and security plans and procedures, taking steps to protect transit infrastructure and patrons and to increase the transit security presence while giving riders a sense of security.
Some initiatives around the country include:
- Increased surveillance via closed circuit TV
- Increased training for employees
- Hired more police, K-9 units added
- Chemical detection systems being tested
- Infrastructure design to eliminate hiding places
- Drills are routinely held with first responders
- Encouraging riders to be vigilant for suspicious activities or items.
After September 11, transit systems enhanced efforts to prevent unauthorized entry into transit facilities. The need for employees and passengers to stay alert and report suspicious occurrences became a key goal of many agencies. These efforts are paying off. But, while many transit agencies are more secure than they were prior to September 11, more can and should be done.
APTA has launched additional efforts to further transit industry security and preparedness, collaborating with FTA in developing emergency preparedness forums, and sponsoring and organizing security-related conferences and workshops. Moreover, APTA developed a list of critical safety and security needs faced by the transit industry, which it has provided to the Department of Transportation and the U.S. Congress.
ONGOING TRANSIT SECURITY PROGRAMS
Mr. Chairman, while transit agencies have moved to a heightened level of security alertness, the leadership of APTA has been actively working with its strategic partners to develop a practical plan to address our industry's security and emergency preparedness needs. Shortly after the September 11 events, the APTA Executive Committee established a Security Task Force. The APTA Security Task Force has established a security strategic plan that prioritizes direction for our initiatives. Among those initiatives, the Task Force serves as the steering group for determining security projects with more than $2 million in Transit Cooperative Research funding through the Transportation Research Board.
Through this funding, APTA has conducted four transit security workshop forums around the nation for the larger transit systems with potentially greater risk exposure. These workshops provided confidential settings to enable sharing of security practices and applying methodologies to various scenarios. The outcomes from these workshops were made available in a controlled and confidential format to other transit agencies unable to attend the workshops. The workshops were held in New York, San Francisco, Atlanta, and Chicago.
In partnerships with the Transportation Research Board, the APTA Security Task Force has also established two TCRP Panels that identified and initiated specific projects developed to address Preparedness/Detection/Response to Incidents and Prevention and Mitigation. The Security Task Force emphasized the importance for the research projects to be operationally practical.
In addition to the TCRP funded efforts, a generic Checklist For Transit Agency Review Of Emergency Response Planning And System Review has been developed by APTA as a resource tool and is available on the APTA web site. Also through the direction of the Security Task Force, APTA has reached out to other organizations and international transportation associations to formally engage in sharing information on our respective security programs and to continue efforts that raise the bar for safety and security effectiveness.
APTA has long-established Safety Audit Programs for Commuter Rail, Bus, and Rail Transit Operations. Within the scope of these programs are specific elements pertaining to Emergency Response Planning and Training as well as Security Planning. In keeping with our industry's increased emphasis on these areas, the APTA Safety Audit Programs have been modified to place added attention to these critical elements.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, in light of our nation's heightened security needs post 9/11, we believe that increased federal investment in public transportation security by Congress and DHS is critical. The public transportation industry has made great strides in transit security improvements since 9/11 but much more needs to be done. We look forward to building on our cooperative working relationship with the Department of Homeland Security and Congress to begin to address these needs. We again thank you and the Committee for allowing us to submit testimony on these critical issues, and look forward to working with you on safety and security issues.
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